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of

EDITED BY J. H. MUIRHEAD, M.A.

THE LIBRARY OF PHILOSOPHY.

THE LIBRARY OF PHILOSOPHY is in the first in- stance a contribution to the History of Thought. While much has been done in England in tracing the course of evo- lution in nature, history, religion, and morality, comparatively little has been done in tracing the development of thought upon these and kindred subjects, and yet "the evolution of opinion is part of the whole evolution."

This Library will deal mainly with Modern Philosophy, partly because Ancient Philosophy has already had a fair share of attention in this country through the labours of Grote, Ferrier, and others, and more recently through translations from Zeller ; partly because the Library does not profess to give a complete history of thought.

By the co-operation of different writers in carrying out this plan, it is hoped that a completeness and thoroughness of treat- ment otherwise unattainable will be secured. It is believed, also, that from writers mainly English and American fuller consideration of English Philosophy than it has hitherto re- ceived from the great German Histories of Philosophy may be looked for. In the departments of Ethics, Economics, and Politics, for instance, the contributions of English writers to the common stock of theoretic discussion have been especially valuable, and these subjects will accordingly have special pro- minence in this undertaking.

Another feature in the plan of the Library is its arrange- ment according to subjects rather than authors and dates, enabling the writers to follow out and exhibit in a way hitherto unattempted the results of the logical development of particular lines of thought.

The historical portion of the Library is divided into two sections, of which the first contains works upon the develop- ment of particular schools of Philosophy, while the second ex- hibits the history of theory in particular departments. The third series contains original contributions to Philosophy, and the fourth translations of valuable foreign works.

To these has been added, by way of Introduction to the whole Library, an English translation of Erdmann's "History of Philosophy," long since recognised in Germany as the best.

J. H. MUIRHEAD,

General Editor.

(ALREADY PUBLISHED.)

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. By DR. J. E. ERDMANN.

English Translation. Edited by PROFESSOR W. S. HOUGH, Minneapolis, U.S.A., in 3 vols. Vols. i. and ii., each i$s. ; vol. iii. 12s.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEOLOGY IN GERMANY SINCE KANT, AND ITS PRO- GRESS IN GREAT BRITAIN SINCE 1825. By OTTO PFLEIDERER, D.D., Pro- fessor of Theology in the University of Berlin. Translated by J. FREDERICK SMITH.

LIST OF WORKS IN PREPARATION. FIRST SERIES:—

EARLY IDEALISM : Descartes to Leibnitz. By W. L. COURTNEY, M.A., Hon. LL.D. (St. Andrew's), Fellow of New College, Oxford.

GERMAN IDEALISTS : Kant to Hegel. By WM. WALLACE, Whyte Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Oxford.

MODERN REALISTS : Herbart, Lotze, etc. By ANDREW SETH, M.A., Professor of Logic and English Literature, University of St. Andrew's.

SENSATIONALISTS : Locke to Mill. By W. S. HOUGH, Ph.M., Assistant Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy, University of Minnesota.

THE ETHICS OF IDEALISM : Kant and Hegel. By HENRY JONES, M.A., Pro- fessor of Mental and Moral Philosophy, University College, Bangor.

THE UTILITARIANS : Hume to Contemporary Writers. By W. R. SORLEY, M.A., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and Professor of Philosophy in Uni- versity College, Cardiff.

MORAL SENSE WRITERS : Shaftesbury to Martineau. By WILLIAM KNIGHT, M.A., Professor of Moral Philosophy, St. Andrew's, N.B.

PRINCIPLE OF EVOLUTION IN ITS SCIENTIFIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS : By JOHN WATSON, LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Queen's College, Kingston, Canada. -,

SECOND SERIES:—

THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY : Empirical and Rational. By ROBERT ADAMSON,

M.A., LL.D., Professor of Logic and Political Economy, Owen's College,

Manchester. THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. By D. G. RITCHIE, M.A., Fellow

of Jesus College, Oxford. PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMICS IN THEIR HISTORICAL RELATIONS. By J.

BONAR, M.A., LL.D. THE HISTORY OF ^ESTHETICS. By BERNARD BOSANQUET, M.A., late Fellow

of University College, Oxford.

THIRD SERIES:—

THE THEORY OF ETHICS. By EDWARD CAIRO, LL.D., Professor of Moral

Philosophy in the University of Glasgow. EPISTEMOLOGY, OR THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. By JAMES WARD, D.Sc.,

LL.D.. Fellow and Lecturer of Trinity College, Cambridge. PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. By G. F. STOUT, M.A., Fellow of St. John's

College, Cambridge. PRINCIPLES OF INSTRUMENTAL LOGIC. By JOHN DEWEY, Ph.D., Professor of

Philosophy in the University of Michigan.

FOURTH SERIES:—

SIGWART'S LOGIC. Translated by HELEN DENDY. 2 vols.

SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & Co., LONDON. MACMILLAN & Co., NEW YORK.

ERDMANN'S HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

NOTICES OF THE PRESS.

"A SPLENDID monument of patient labour, critical acumen, and admirable methodical treatment. . . . It is not too much to predict that, for the library of the savant, for the academical student, whose business it is to be primed in the wisdom of the ages, and for the literary dilettante, who is nothing if not well up in * things that everybody ought to know,' these volumes will at once become a necessity for purposes, at least, of reference, if not of actual study. . . . We possses nothing that can bear any comparison with it in point of completeness." — Pall Mall Gazette.

" It is not necessary to speak of the great merits of Erdmann's History of Philosophy. Its remarkable clearness and comprehensiveness are well known. . . . The translation is a good, faithful rendering, and in some parts even reaches a high literary level."— Professor JOHN WATSON in The Week, of Canada.

" It is matter of real congratulation, in the dearth still of original English or American work over the whole field of historical philosophy, that by the side of the one important German compend of this generation, the other, so well fitted to serve as its complement, is now made accessible to the English-speaking student." — Mind.

" It has been long known, highly esteemed, and in its successive editions has sought to make itself more worthy of the success it has justly achieved. Erd- mann's work is excellent. His history of mediaeval philosophy especially deserves attention and praise for its comparative fulness and its admirable scholarship. . . . It must prove a valuable and much-needed addition to our philosophical works." — Scotsman.

" The combination of qualities necessary to produce a work of the scope and grade of Erdmann's is rare. Industry, accuracy, and a fair degree of philosophic understanding may give us a work like Ueberweg's ; but Erdmann's history, while in no way superseding Ueberweg's as a hand book for general use, yet occupies a different position. Erdmann wrote his book, not as a reference book, to give in brief compass a digest of the writings of various authors, but as a genuine history of philosophy, tracing in a genetic way the development of thought in its treat- ment of philosophic problems. Its purpose is to develop philosophic intelligence rather than to furnish information. When we add that, to the successful execution of this intention, Erdmann unites a minute and exhaustive knowledge of philo- sophic sources at first hand, equalled over the entire field of philosophy probably by no other one man, we are in a condition to form some idea of the value of the book. To the student who wishes, not simply a general idea of the course of philosophy, nor a summary of what this and that man has said, but a somewhat detailed knowledge of the evolution of thought, and of what this and the other writer have contributed to it, Erdmann is indispensable ; there is no substitute." — Professor JOHN DEWEY, in The Andover Review.

" It is a work that is at once compact enough for the ordinary student, and full enough for the reader of literature. ... At once systematic and interesting." — Journal of Education.

" The learning shown in it is large, the arrangement orderly, the mental candor unusual, the point of view — that of Hegel— clear and frankly acknowledged, the style perspicuous, and without affectation. These are excellences enough to make a book of solidity and serviceableness. Erdmann's is something more ; it is a book of a certain distinction. Homely as it usually is, on every page we encounter not the dry-as-dust compiler, but a freshly working mind, full of sympathies and beliefs, individual in its attitude, its processes, and its terms of expression. Strength and honesty of personality give a winning impress to large scholarship." — Nation.

THE

DEVELOPMENT OF THEOLOGY

IN GERMANY SINCE KANT,

AND ITS

PROGRESS IN GREAT BRITAIN SINCE 1828.

THE

DEVELOPMENT OF THEOLOGY

IN GERMANY SINCE KANT,

AND ITS

PROGRESS IN GREAT BRITAIN SINCE 1825.

BY

OTTO PFLEIDERER, D.D.,

Professor of Theology in the University of Berlin.

TRANSLATED UNDER THE AUTHOR'S SUPERVISION BY

J. FREDERICK SMITH.

LONDON : SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO.,

NEW YORK: MACMILLAN & CO.

1890.

BUTLER & TANNER,

THE SELWOOD PRINTING WORKS,

FROME, AND LONDON.

PREFACE.

Two years ago I was asked by the Editor of the Library of Philosophy to write the volume tracing the Development of Theology since Kant. According to the more precise statement of its scope, the work was to deal principally with the History of Modern Theology in Germany, but it was desired that it should include an account of the Protestant Theology of this century in other countries, particularly in Great Britain. Although I did not shut my eyes to the difficulties of the task, I resolved to undertake it, with the hope that I might thereby contribute a little towards a better mutual understanding between the German and English nations, especially towards the rempval of numerous prejudices that still prevail in Great Britain with regard to the tendencies of the German mind and make it difficult for Englishmen to form a just view of our national character and aims.

But no sooner was the work actually taken in hand than the necessity appeared of a reduction of its scope within narrower limits in several respects. An account of theology outside Germany which should be at all satisfactory seemed to me impossible without a study of it on the spot in the respective countries. On this account I was compelled to leave entirely out of my survey the Theology of Holland1 and America, and to confine myself to that of Great Britain. With British Theology I had for years kept myself so far in touch that a sojourn of some weeks in England and Scotland was sufficient, with the kind assistance of

1 I have made an exception in the case of the critical labours of Dr. Kuenen, of Leyden, which have had a decided influence on the progress of German Theology. This scientific annexation of the distinguished Theolo- gian of the Netherlands will, I hope, be considered excusable.

PREFACE.

friendly theologians there, to supply the gaps in my know- ledge and enable me to make a survey of the develop- ment of the Philosophy of Religion and Theology in Britain during the present century ; though notwithstanding all the pains I have bestowed upon the survey, I must fall back upon the kind consideration of my British readers.

But even when the range of the work had been thus re- duced, the extent of the matters to be dealt with exceeded the limits of a volume of this series, so that I was obliged to lay down definite lines in the selection of what really belongs to my subject. As this is the development of theological thought, everything that belongs to the department of practical church life, such as ecclesiastico-political events and party conflicts, or philanthropic movements of church societies, could at once be excluded. It was more difficult to draw the line with reference to non-theological science, particularly philosophy. Philosophy has in various ways had so much influence on the Theology of our century, that it is impossible quite to ignore it in a history of the latter. I have therefore brought it within the limits of my account so far, and only so far, as it has exerted a direct influence on the development of Theo- logy. From the nature of the case, the line drawn cannot be so hard and fast that the concurrence of all readers in the selection made is to be expected. And those readers who may perhaps look for a more detailed treatment of the Philosophy of Religion in Germany, may be referred to my History of the Philosophy of Religion from Spinoza to the Present Time, of which there is an English translation.

As regards the treatment of the materials, I have through- out abstained from giving a complete, statistical enumeration of all the writers and titles of books holding a place in the theological literature of this century. Such a catalogue would have served but little the purpose of this book. I have re- garded it as far more appropriate to deal somewhat more fully with the characteristic and important men and move- ments, rather than by a mass of unimportant details to render

PREFACE. XI

the survey of the course of development difficult. Further, I dislike above all things that method of writing history which presents nothing but the writer's subjective judgment of people, without so much as allowing them to say what their own opinions and views are. To take all men as what they show themselves to be, is the only way in which we can pay due regard to historical justice.

I have found but very few books to help me in my work. For the period under review Dorner's History of Protestant Theology is much too meagre. The books of Carl Schwarz and Landerer on Recent Theology, unlike as they are as re- gards style, the first being as brilliant as the second is dry, are very much alike in this, that both have much more to say of men than they allow men to say for themselves. In the survey of English Theology, Dr. Tulloch's Movements of Religious Thought has supplied me with useful points of observation,

at all events for some parts of my sketch.

i

OTTO PFLEIDERER.

GROSS LlCHTERFELDE, NEAR BERLIN.

EDITOR'S NOTE.

Dr. Pfleiderers work is not a translation in the ordinary sense. It has been written for the Library of Philosophy, and appears first in English. This involves the disadvantage that the reader will not have (as usually in translations) the original to which to refer in case of doubt. For this reason special care has been taken to secure a clear and accurate rendering. The Authors MS. has been translated into English by Mr. J. Frederick Smith, whose work has been revised in proof by Dr. Pfleiderer, by the translator, and by myself.

GENERAL EDITOR,

CONTENTS.

BOOK I.

THE BASIS OF MODERN THEOLOGY IN GERMAN IDEALISTIC

PHILOSOPHY.

PAGE

CHAPTER I. Kant 3

„ II. Herder 21

„ III. Schleiermacher 44

„ IV. Fichte 57

„ V. Schelling . . 62

„ VI. Hegel 68

BOOK II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOGMATIC THEOLOGY UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF IDEALISTIC PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER I. The Theology of the School of Kant .... 85

„ II. The Theology of the School of Schleiermacher . . 103

„ III. Speculative Theology 131

„ IV. Eclectic Theologians 154

BOOK III.

BIBLICAL AND HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

CHAPTER I. New Testament Criticism and Exegesis. . . . 209 „ II. Old Testament Criticism and Exegesis . . . . 252 „ III. History of the Church and of Dogma .... 277

BOOK IV.

A SURVEY OF THE PROGRESS OF THEOLOGY IN GREAT

BRITAIN SINCE 1825.

CHAPTER I. The Schools of Philosophy in their relation to Theology 303 „ II. Parties and Movements in Theology . . ., . 355

INDEX 402

BOOK I.

THE BASIS OF MODERN THEOLOGY IN GERMAN IDEALISTIC PHILOSOPHY.

G. T.

CHAPTER I.

KANT.

IN the year 1784 Kant wrote an essay upon the question, What is Aufkliirung ?l In it he reviews the tendencies of his age, and at the same time indicates in what sense he con- siders them justifiable and is willing to further them. This essay may be regarded as the programme of the task to which German philosophy in Kant and his successors has devoted itself.

1 * Free Thought," says Kant, "is the advance, of man beyond the state of voluntary immaturity. By immaturity is meant, inability to use his own understanding except under the guidance of another. The immaturity is voluntary when the cause of it is not want of intelligence, but of resolution and courage to use it without another's guidance. Sapere aude ! Dare to use thy own understanding ! is therefore the motto of Free Thought. If the question be asked, * Do we live in a free- thinking age?' the answer is, 'No; but we live in an age of free-thought/ As things are at present, men as a whole are very far from possessing, or even from being able to acquire, the power of making a sure and right use of their own understandings in religious matters without the guidance of others. On the other hand, we have clear indications that the field now lies nevertheless open before them, to which they can freely make their way, and that the hindrances to general Freedom of Thought, or the abandon- ment of the state of voluntary immaturity, are gradually be- coming less. In this sense the present age is the age of Free Thought, or the century of Frederick the Great."

1 Aufklarung. Any translation of this terminus technicus may mislead. From Kant's authoritative definition of the thing, it appears that our English " Free-thinking" substantially represents it. — Tr.

4 BASIS OF MODERN THEOLOGY. [Bk. I.

It is only by slow degrees that the people generally can reach Freedom of Thought. It is not by means of a revolu- tion, which can never effect a real reform in habits of thought ; a revolution only exchanges old prejudices for new, which then, as much as the old ones, serve as leading-strings to the unthinking crowd. The one proper method is the free use of reason as a public right, whereby the wise are put in a position to diffuse their superior intelligence and render it the common property of all. To check the free public employ- ment of reason, in the interests of any existing social institu- tions or laws, would, in Kant's view, be " a sin against the nature of man, the primary purpose of which consists in just this advance in Free Thinking." Moreover, this public use of reason by the learned, Kant argues, involves no danger, inasmuch as it does not seek by any means to put an end to the performance of civil duties or of the obligations imposed on each man by his calling ; it was precisely under the veil of severe civil discipline, as it existed in the State of Frederick, that freedom of mind had more room to spread than is usually the case where there is greater civil liberty. When once however by freedom of thought the mental habits of a nation have been so educated that it is rendered more capable of freedom in action, this education finally reacts upon the maxims of the government in such a way that it treats men no longer as machines but in a manner suited to their true dignity.

We see from this essay that Kant participated to the full in the movement of his age towards Aufklarung, but that he gauged its meaning otherwise and more profoundly than did his contemporaries. He is no less opposed to the complacent vanity of the German popular philosophers, who thought that they already possessed Aufkldrung — the truth in religion and morals, — than he is to the radicalism of the French party of progress, who imagined that they could reach the goal by means of revolution, by abjuring in theory and practice all existing beliefs and institutions. Of course, according to Kantj mankind is bound to be rationally free and enlightened, but they are not so as yet ; and will not become so by merely discarding old prejudices, but only by a " true reform in habits of thought," whereby they will be enabled to " make a sure and right use" of their own understandings. To educate mankind for this true employment of the understanding is

Ch. I.] KANT.

the vocation of men of letters, and more especially of philo- sophers, a task which was made possible in Frederick's State. It is therefore not enough for men to learn to use their own understanding ; they must also learn to use it rightly ; to help them to do this is the primary and essential vocation of philo- sophy as Kant understood it. But if we wish to ensure the true use of the understanding by a method which is univer- sally valid, we must first critically examine the laws which are involved in the very nature of the understanding itself. For the knowledge of a truth which is valid for every one is possible only when based on laws which are involved in the nature of the human mind as such, and have not been im- ported into it from without through facts of experience which must always be accidental and conditional. Kant is con- vinced of the existence of such primary laws, involved in the very constitution of the human mind. He looks upon them as laws which do not arise from experience, but which are rather prior to all experience, and, as determining its form, lie at the root of all theoretical, practical, and aesthetic judgments out of which the world of consciousness is built up. He has thrown this conviction into a scientific shape in the three critiques, namely of the Pure and of the Practical Reason, and of the Faculty of Judgment. On the one hand, Em- pirical Philosophy had held that all knowledge arises purely from without, from experienced perceptions, but had not been able to explain the fact that experience always conforms to law. Rationalistic Philosophy, again, had sought to derive all knowledge from the constitution of the mind itself, from its innate ideas, but had left out of consideration its dependence upon experience, and had confounded the empty creations of thought with reality. Once more, both the rival schools of Empirical and Rationalistic philosophers had agreed at least in regarding all knowledge as something given — whether from without or from within — and the knowing mind as only its passive recipient. Kant, on the contrary, taught that all cogni- tion rests upon the union of the mind's activity and receptivity; inasmuch as the material is given us in the multiformity of our perceptions, sensations, and sense-affections ; but the formation of this material into a system of knowledge is the work of our own activity, this activity, in accordance with its own laws, giving to the material the form of rationality, which consti- tutes the truth of our cognition. In opposition, therefore, to

6 BASIS OF MODERN THEOLOGY. [Bk. I.

Rationalistic philosophy, Kant taught the dependence of the act of cognition on the material supplied in experience in space and time, and the impossibility of knowing the reality (das Ding an sick) lying behind these facts of experience. In opposition to Empirical philosophy, he taught that it is the subject which, by means of its characteristic perception of things under the forms of space and time and of the categories, converts this chaotic material into the regular orderly world called "experience"; and that in this respect the under- standing itself is to be regarded as imposing lawrs on nature.

It was this latter conception, viz., of reason, both in theoreti- cal knowledge and in practical judgments, imposing laws upon itself, which was the essence of Kant's thought and the open- ing of a new era of philosophy. Of this there can be no doubt in the mind of any one who recognises the connexion between the different parts of the system, and its relation to the theories which preceded and followed it. It has, how- ever, been widely supposed for some time, and particularly in theological circles, that the main point in Kant's philosophy is the limitation of human knowledge to phenomena, and the proof that we cannot know anything of the region lying beyond them. Nor can it be denied that Kant himself laid great emphasis upon this side of his teaching, inasmuch as this limitation of the speculative reason seemed to him the preliminary basis of the unconditional character of the prac- tical reason. Nevertheless this view is obviously erroneous ; were it true, it would be impossible to say what claim to originality Kant's philosophy possessed, and how it could lay down the lines for future development. For a glance at English philosophy prior to Kant shows that Locke, Berkeley, and especially Hume, had limited our knowledge to the phe- nomena of consciousness, and had pronounced the reference of these phenomena to a trans-subjective reality a supposition incapable of proof, and likewise valueless, on account of the incognisability of the problematical external object. In the case of Hume this was the necessary consequence of his scep- tical dissolution of the idea of causation, in which he saw only the expression of the customary transition of imagination from one idea to another, a subjective fiction which could not possibly carry us from the phenomena of consciousness to trans-subjective reality. If, therefore, this negative side of Kant's philosophy — the limitation of our knowledge to ex-

Ch. I.] KANT.

perience — were the important part of it, it would have been a repetition of that of his predecessor, Hume. Indeed, we should be compelled to allow that, in point of consistency, Kant was inferior to Hume, since he admittedly broke through this limitation in several respects : he made things-in-them- selves the causes of sensations or experience ; the freedom of man's intelligible character the cause of actions in time ; God the cause of the existence of the highest good, or of the unity of the natural and moral worlds. He thus indisputably ex- tended the category of causation to transcendental objects, in spite of its presupposed limitation to the world of experience. Such inconsistency would be quite incomprehensible if, as is ordinarily supposed, this sceptical doctrine were the gist and real object of Kant's theory of knowledge. The real state of the case is as follows : Kant had been impressed by the imposing character of Hume's sceptical philosophy, and had adopted its doctrine of the incognisability of things-in-them- selves ; this principle he had accepted prior to his own critical inquiry into the forms of cognition inherent in the human mind, but afterwards regarded as the result of this inquiry, though, if he had undertaken the inquiry independently of this preconceived opinion, he would have come to the oppo- site conclusion. This timidity, which hesitated to leap, with the aid of the idea of causality, the confines of the pheno- mena of consciousness, and to lay hold of things-in-themselves, was a legacy from the scepticism of Hume, from which Kant was unable completely to free himself, even when, in oppo- sition to Hume, he reasserted for the idea of causation its rightful position as one of the fundamental a priori forms of judgment. It was, therefore, net the desertion of Kant's philosophy, but simply the true and necessary carrying out of its speculative principle and most characteristic position, when his successors rejected this sceptical limitation of our know- ledge, and credited thought with the power of theoretically conceiving Being, as well as of practically moulding it ; when, in other words, they put an end to the Kantian dualism of the Theoretical Reason, limited to the world of phenomena, and the Practical Reason, dwelling in the world of the intelligible. The Practical Philosophy of Kant is partly the complement, partly the antithesis of his theoretical philosophy. In his theory of knowledge he had aimed at proving that cognition is governed by the a priori forms existing in the understanding,

8 BASIS OF MODERN THEOLOGY. [Bk. I.,

independently of experience, but for that very reason limited the action of the mind in cognition to merely the formal work- ing-up of given conceptions. Similarly, in order that the law of moral action may possess unconditional and universal vali- dity, it must, in Kant's view, be independent of experience, and belong to the reason a priori, i.e., must be autonomous; it is as much the province of Reason as Practical to lay down laws for action, as of the Speculative Reason to do this for cognition ; but at the same time, if this practical law is to be a priori, it must be limited to \htform of action merely, and must not include any object of desire since the will can be influenced by an object of desire, only by the expectation of pleasure, a motive which acts differently in different individuals, and belongs to the lower sense-faculty of desire and hence can never claim universal or unconditional validity. All material principles, whatever their contents, are, according to Kant, equally eudsemonistic; they depend upon self-love, or the lower faculty of desire, and have only a subjective and empiri- cally conditioned validity ; they are therefore merely pruden- tial maxims, not pure laws of reason. The autonomous law, characteristic of reason, must accordingly relate solely to the general form of action, without the slightest admixture of material motives, which would only sully its purity ; its com- mand as the " Categorical Imperative " is : Act so that the rule governing thy will may also always serve as the principle of a universal legislation.

Thus far Kant's doctrine of the legislation of the practical reason seems to form a complete parallel to that of the specu- lative reason ; but as soon as we look more closely at the rela- tion of form and contents, an essential distinction becomes apparent. In the sphere of knowledge, form and contents, in spite of their different origin, are in no way really opposed, but only exist for, and with each other ; we are compelled to bring every object of sense-experience under the a priori forms of intuition and of thought, and our sense-perceptions, instead of being antagonistic to these forms, can only be apprehended by their means. It is quite otherwise in the sphere of action. The moral law is indeed the form of a priori validity, which we can and ought to apply as a criterion to every object of sense-desire — i.e., to our empirical inclina- tions and actions ; but we are by no means compelled to do this ; we are able to follow the natural inclinations produced

Ch. I.] KANT.

by the contents of our sense-experience, which so little submit without resistance to this a priori form, that, in Kant's view, they are invariably opposed to the law of reason, and so produce a never-ending struggle between duty and inclination. Hence the moral law is the form which, on the one hand, has need of the contents supplied _by the empirical desires, since without them it would not reach action at all, and so the law find no application ; but, on the other hand, this form is also represented as involved in a ceaseless opposition and conflict with their contents. This conception is plainly unrealisable ; we cannot see how a moral law without contents, and simply opposed to all empirical inclinations could ever become a motive of action, or how definite obligatory actions could be deduced from it. It is, no doubt, true that there is often a conflict between duty and inclination, and that in this conflict the claims of duty are the higher, and the only absolute ones ; it is the great merit of Kant's moral philosophy to have brought out this truth with all possible emphasis. But it is equally certain that the letter of his theory is untenable. His mistake lay in thinking that the law of reason must be made purely formal to have unconditional validity, and in attributing all actual motives of action, all inclinations, to sense-desire, thus representing them as hostile to reason. In this way his moral system acquired a harsh, ascetic character, exceeding in rigour even that of the Stoics. The ground of this was essentially the same in both cases : the absolute dualism between reason and sensation, between man as an "intelligible" being, endowed with freedom and reason, and man as a being of sense endowed with natural desire. If the two are so com- pletely disjoined as abstract anti-natural Idealism, which still influenced Kant, maintained, we cannot understand how the commands of reason could ever coincide with man's actual wishes and actions. In order that anything may be a motive, it must be a possible object of desire ; the moral law accor- dingly can be a higher motive than single accidental inclina- tions only by including a higher object, which, as uncondition- ally valuable, is superior to all merely conditional ends. If, however, the moral law includes a concrete end, it is no longer purely formal ; it is no longer opposed to all inclinations, but can itself become the object of reasonable inclination ; in that case there is no longer the absolute dualism, asserted by Kant, between man as desiring and man as thinking, and finally,

IO BASIS OF MODERN THEOLOGY. [Bk. I.

there is from the first an inner connection between the sense- world of experience and the " intelligible world," which warrants the hope of the synthesis of both in human action and cog- nition.

In Kant himself we find several hints of this correction of the purely formal and dualistic character of his moral philosophy ; and these hints only need working out in order to render the rational principle of this philosophy supreme in the sphere of ethics. Kant was at bottom really held back here only by the same want of courage in working out his speculative principle as is traceable in his theory of know- ledge ; the hindrance there was the influence of the scepti- cism of Hume, here it was the dread of sullying the purity of idealistic ethical principles, by a compromise with empirical principles. His demand of a purely formal ethical principle was violated by Kant himself even in the definition of moral philosophy as the science of the ends of pure reason, and by the deduction of the supreme, unconditionally desirable end from the dignity of man as a rational being ; whence he derived the formula of his First Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics : " Act so as to use humanity, both in thine own person and in the person of every other man, always as an end, never solely as a means." To treat humanity in each individual as an end in itself, clearly means the recognition of a general end of humanity, and making its realisation in each man our object. Thus the moral law acquires as its contents a definite material end, from which the particular moral ends also may be deduced. This deduction can, how- ever, only be made by means of empirical observation, both of the capacities and faculties involved in the natures of man, and of their employment and development as gathered from history. From the admission of this empirical observation Kant was deterred for the reasons given above, and was thus prevented from utilising in science this pregnant formula. In his theory of virtue he did, indeed, try to deduce the neces- sity of our own personal perfection and of the happiness of others as the two main divisions of the virtues. But it is clear that he could not do this consistently with his own premises. If, as he is elsewhere never tired of insisting, any appeal to empirical motives derived from the desire for happi- ness is a pollution of morality, it is difficult to see how to seek the happiness of others can be reasonably made a duty ;

Ch. I.] KANT. I I

for if happiness is in no respect a desirable moral end, the happiness of others can no more than our own be such an end ; while, conversely, if the happiness of others is to be sought, it is not easy to see why our own should not be so also, more especially in view of the Kantian principle of the universal applicability of the moral rule — "what is right for the one must also be fair for the other." When we add that Kant, in the explanatory justification of his principle, has already emphasised the evil effects which every one would feel if his selfish conduct were made into a universal prin- ciple, we can hardly dissent from those who consider that in working out his moral system he did not remain true to the rigour of his primary principle, but fell back into that utili- tarianism which he so greatly abhors. This inconsistency was only the natural result of the excessive rigour with which he insisted on his a priori principle, until it became a system of forms without contents, the defects of which necessitated a recourse to alien points of view.

Kant exhibits, however, surprising points of agreement, not only with the strictly philosophical, but also with the theological utilitarianism of his time. In the Critique of Pure Reason he had shown that the ideas of Freedom, Immor- tality (soul), and God could not be objects of theoretical knowledge, inasmuch as insoluble contradictions arise when- ever a proof of them is attempted. But what is denied to the speculative, can, he maintains, be grasped by the practical reason. Though to the former the world of noumena lying behind phenomena is closed, to the latter it is directly re- vealed in the moral law, which makes man a citizen of the "intelligible world" of freedom. From this position the above ideas may be established as " Postulates," i.e., as pre- suppositions which we feel compelled to make, not in order to enlarge our knowledge, but in order to render possible the realisation of the moral law. In the first place, we thus gain the postulate of freedom as the basis of the reality of moral law, just as this law is the basis of the cognisability of freedom ; for, inasmuch as we ought to do the good, it follows that we can do it. Nevertheless the moral law is perpetually obstructed by the motives of sense-desire. These obstructions it is able and bound to overcome more and more ; but can never do this so completely that the law will be fully realised in finite time ; hence its realisation demands the infinite

1 2 BASIS OF MODERN THEOLOGY. [Bk. I.

duration of the individual, or immortality. Finally, reason as a legislative faculty demands the realisation of an absolute end or supreme good, which must embrace both perfect virtue and a corresponding state of happiness, and happiness not included in virtue, but dependent upon natural conditions beyond our control. Hence arises the demand for a supreme Cause, capable of bringing nature into harmony with the moral law of rational beings, or of connecting happiness with the virtue that deserves it ; in other words, the supreme good proposed by reason demands the existence of God as the condition of its possibility. Thus the transcendental ideas are the objects of a " moral faith " rooted in reason. It is true that by this faith the speculative reason receives no addition to its knowledge, but by its critical precautions it can render at least the negative service of keeping these ideas free from anthropomorphic impurities and superstitious abuse. It has indeed always been with good reason maintained that this mode of establishing belief in the existence of God can with difficulty be harmonized with the main principle of Kant's ethics. If the moral law is throughout to have nothing to do with sense-desire or happiness, it is hard to see how, on the other hand, happiness can be pronounced an integral part of the supreme good aimed at by reason and a divine cause be demanded to produce it. The affinity of this train of thought to theological utilitarianism is so obvious, that many have not unreasonably seen in it a retrogression on the part of Kant to the eudaemonistic point of view of the popular philosophy,1 and that Kant's philosophical successors pre- ferred to work out his speculative principle to its logical results without his theological postulates.

Still, fully justified as these objections to the literal form of Kant's postulate undoubtedly are, we cannot deny that underneath it lay a true idea, which appears in a purer form in the Critique of Judgment. Kant here tries to find some connecting link between the intelligible and sensible worlds, between freedom and nature, in the idea of a teleology common to both. In order to explain nature we find our-

1 Jacobi, Fichte, Herder, Schleiermacher, unanimously rejected Kant's line of argument, sometimes in very strong terms. Of more recent authors, compare the criticisms of Dilthey (Leben Schleiermacher s, I. 127, seq.), Bieder- mann (Deutschlatid im 18 Jahrh^ II. 902), Wundt (Ethik, 319, seq.).

Ch. I.] KANT. 1 3

selves compelled to combine the principle of teleology with the mechanical principle or causality ; for in organic nature we see that the parts are determined by their relation to the whole, are means to the inner end of the organism. To the question, how the teleological explanation can be harmonised with that of causality, Kant's answer is, in the first instance, that the conception of ends in nature is not of such value as to add to our knowledge of facts, but is only a regulative principle for our reflective judgment ; it is primarily owing to the structure of our subjective understanding merely that we cannot help regarding nature as governed by final causes. But Kant cannot rest in this sceptical subjectivity ; he teaches that if the two principles are to be harmonised, they must be combined under one supreme common principle, viz., in a super-sensible substratum, or actual cause of nature ; of this cause we must form a corresponding intellectual intuition, that is to say, we conceive it as not merely causal, but as at the same time the primal intellect, whose thought is not like ours discursive, but necessarily intuitive (thinking the whole simultaneously with its parts). It is true he does, at the same time, again sceptically confess that objectively we can neither assert nor deny the